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Chameleon Masculinity: Developing the  
British ‘Population-Centred’ Soldier  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this article I develop what I term chameleon masculinity as a specific form of gendered 
adaptation of military agency opened up by the post 9/11 shift towards ‘population-centred’ 
counterinsurgency and Stabilisation. A gendered analysis of this carefully cultivated form of 
military agency is central to revealing some of the concealed embodied dynamics that 
challenge the hegemony of the traditional combat soldier, and in practice enable this form of 
war. Drawing on eighteen months of anthropological fieldwork, for the most part alongside 
the UK’s Military Stabilisation Support Group, this research incorporates my auto-
ethnography as an Officer in the Royal Naval Reserves. Rather than focusing at the level of 
policy, strategy, and doctrine, I examine how the specialised and masculinised agency of the 
chameleon translates tactically into the body of the British military Stabilisation Operative, 
showing how this is developed though intensive pre-deployment training in the UK, and 
embodied and practiced through operational deployment in Afghanistan. This reveals the 
specific agency of chameleon masculinity and how its potential for inherent violence becomes 
deceptively ‘hidden in plain sight’. 
 
Key words: gender, masculinity, British military, counterinsurgency, stabilisation, anthropology, 
embodiment, agency, auto-ethnography 
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Chameleon Masculinity: Developing the  
British ‘Population-Centred’ Soldier  
 
 
“War is, therefore, not only a veritable chameleon, because in each concrete case it changes 
somewhat its character, but it is also ... a strange trinity.” 
(Clausewitz, [1832] 1950: 18) 
 
“There’s a method of altering how you conduct yourself. You need to know what the audience’s end 
state is, you need to influence, cajole and sometimes slap to get where you need to go. It’s a bit like 
being a chameleon, and I don’t mean that in a deceptive way.” 
(Major R_, UK Military Stabilisation Support Group, Field Notes, June 2009) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION   
 
The nineteenth-century Prussian general and military strategist Carl von Clausewitz made the 
analogy that war was like a chameleon ‘because in each concrete case it changes somewhat its 
character’ (Clausewitz, [1832]1950: 18).  This is true also in contemporary warfare. Recently 
there has been a grand strategic move from a large-scale military focus on overwhelming 
force to kill ‘the enemy’ through ‘hard kinetic’ action towards ‘population-centred’ 
counterinsurgency and Stabilisation practices. The aim has been to win the favour of local 
populations, enticing them towards the State and away from ‘insurgents’ through ‘soft’ ‘non-
kinetic’ approaches or ‘soft power’. Like a chameleon war has yet again changed its outward 
character in relation to context as a means to catch ‘the enemy’, or as defence in order to be 
effective/survive.  
 
In such contexts, and through the training of British ‘population-centred’ soldiers, or military 
‘Stabilisation Operatives’, a specific form of chameleon-like embodied adaptation has 
developed. By using the term chameleon masculinity in this article, I gender a specific form 
of military agency opened up by the post 9/11 shift towards ‘population-centred’ 
counterinsurgency and Stabilisation1. I suggest that such a gendered reading of this carefully 
cultivated form of military agency is central to revealing some of the concealed embodied 
dynamics that challenge the hegemony of the traditional combat soldier. By practising this 
form of chameleon masculinity they are enabling this form of war.  
 
Importantly, gender, like war, has a chameleon-like quality; it is  ‘… extraordinarily 
relational, with a chameleon-like flexibility, shifting in importance, value and effects from 
                                                        
1 In the UK, ‘Stabilisation’ is a cross-governmental process that has primarily drawn together the UK’s departments 
of defence, diplomacy and development, it is based on the ‘promotion of peaceful political settlement to produce a 
legitimate indigenous government’ with the so-called aim of ‘establishing peace and security in countries affected by 
conflict and instability’ (JDN 6/10, 2010: 1-1).  
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context to context or from field to field’ (Adkins and Skeggs, 2004: 6). Within military 
contexts, both military men and women go through a continuous militarisation process where 
they learn to reproduce and subsequently embody a range of culturally specific military 
masculinities. The tongue-in-cheek phrase “It’s not pink and fluffy, it’s difficult and 
dangerous!’ (MoD, 2006), used by one British army NCO to explain their ‘population-
centred’ soldiering role, acknowledges, even as it tries to deny, the friction between the 
‘difficult and dangerous’ traditional masculine ‘warrior’ of the combat soldier and that of the 
‘pink and fluffy’ feminised diplomatic military facilitator.  
 
While binary oppositions, such as ‘pink and fluffy’/’difficult and dangerous’ are useful to 
introduce the debate, the way that masculinities and femininities are (re)produced in their 
multiplicity can be both paradoxical and competing. Gender and the relational constructions 
of masculinity and femininity are practices that are produced socially, therefore the British 
military is a reflection of how social structures shape the actions of military individuals and 
vice versa (Enloe, 2007; Hearn, 1996; Connell, 2002; Kimmel, [2000] 2011: 10).  
 
A gendered analysis at the operational and tactical level is vitally important, not least because 
of the life and death implications for all involved. As Sjoberg argues “it is only possible to 
fully understand gender in the context of war and conflict, and … it is only possible to fully 
understand war and conflict considering their gendered aspects” (Sjoberg, 2014: 5). However, 
as Marcia Kovitz observes, a perceived male/female divide ‘deflects attention from the fault 
lines along which military masculinity fractures internally’, contributing to the ‘perpetuation 
of the military’s attachment to a uniform masculinity (uniformity, strength, etc.) and an 
opposition to femininity (diversity, weakness, etc.)…’ (Kovitz, 2003: 9). This masks the 
tensions ‘between multiple and unequal military masculinities’, themselves crucial clues in 
understanding ‘population-centred’ military masculinity, and specifically chameleon 
masculinity. As one ‘population-centred’ soldier, or military ‘Stabilisation Operative’, told 
me during fieldwork, you need the skills to perform credibly in front of a wide range of 
audiences, ‘to blend in with the environment’. However, if these skills are lacking there is 
intolerance within both wider military and civilian settings. Rather skilfully though he said, 
‘There’s a method of altering how you conduct yourself… It’s a bit like being a chameleon, 
and I don’t mean that in a deceptive way’.  
 
There remains a gap in research, especially British anthropological ethnographic studies, that 
examine the militarisation processes used to develop and generate valour for other figures of 
the soldier as they become politically desirable. A focus on the processes, practices, and 
operational and tactical agency of specialist military units – such as those focused on 
counterinsurgency and Stabilisation - occupying in-between positions at the forefront of 
political, policy and doctrinal change, can provide rich sites for the critical examination of the 
gendered dynamics of militarisation.  
 
Rather than focusing at the level of policy, strategy, and doctrine, this article, through an 
examination of the agency of chameleon masculinity, examines how these then translate 
operationally and tactically into the body of the British military Stabilisation Operative. It 
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explores how these grand strategies are lived, performed and embodied; how they look and 
feel, and also how they challenge, expand, but also constrain the situational and sensory 
awareness of the soldier. I show how this translation occurs through operational deployment 
to Afghanistan and developed through intensive pre-deployment training in the UK. In what 
follows, I outline the context of my field research through my reflexive position in relation to 
the British military. The article then proceeds by firstly introducing the concept of chameleon 
masculinity, secondly by examining chameleon masculinity ‘in action’, and thirdly by 
focusing on how this flexible agency is trained in the UK. 
 
An Auto-Ethnography 
 
Drawing on eighteen months of ethnographic fieldwork, for the most part alongside the UK’s 
Military Stabilisation Support Group from 2008 to 2010, this work has incorporated my own 
auto-ethnography of military membership as an Officer in the Royal Naval Reserves from 
2001 to 2012. Through my dual role as an anthropologist2 and member of the Royal Navy, I 
gradually learnt to oscillate between being an insider (Officer) and an outsider 
(anthropologist) and ‘see’ but more specifically sense these gendered dynamics. A complex 
process happened while I observed the ‘constant and enduring interplay of biological and 
social forces’ as the bodies of those around me were being ‘simultaneously created, 
maintained and changed’ (Gerschick, 2005: 369), and the visible and invisible gendered 
dynamics of this process.  
 
I began my anthropological training in 2003, initially as a Masters student and then as a 
doctoral researcher at the University of Sussex. At the time, the Royal Navy with all its signs, 
symbols, customs, conventions, and my position as a junior female Reservist Officer, 
dominated my experience of the military world. It was in part this lived experience and 
reflexive negotiation of anthropological and military identities that attracted me to the UK’s 
Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG), as I searched for a military role where I might 
fit. I initially approached the Group with a view to joining as the Stabilisation Operative role 
interested me; I felt the methodological similarities with the anthropological participant 
observation approach of gathering information, and the role asked of these Operatives in the 
way they were being trained to interact and engage with people.  
 
However, anthropological involvement with military forces is a highly charged, and 
politically contentious area (see for example, González, 2004, 2009; American 
Anthropological Association, 2007; Robben, 2010; Price, 2011), especially in relation to the 
context of application. As I became more aware of the debates and practices my position as a 
conscientious objector gradually emerged and I made the decision not to deploy operationally 
to Afghanistan. Crucially, despite the Stabilisation role being considered ‘softer’ by the wider 
military and British government, and therefore potentially less directly violent, it was 
essentially a set of non-kinetic warfare practices with a continuum of intended and unintended 
                                                        
2 Importantly, my research was an anthropology ‘of’, rather than ‘for’, the military; it was independently funded 
by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council.  
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violent consequences. Indeed, the gendered nature of Stabilisation would prove to be far from 
stable, rather it was inherently destabilising. My research was focused solely on UK based 
training, and I presented myself as a civilian anthropologist, although my informants knew me 
initially through my military identity. I did however draw on my participant observation of 
military membership and the ‘insider’ knowledge this has generated. Ultimately, my research 
process led to my resignation from the armed forces in 2012, and my choice in developing a 
critical military stance.  
 
In the section that follows, I introduce and situate the concept of chameleon masculinity 
within the broader framing of counterinsurgency and Stabilisation operations.  
 
 
1. CHAMELEON MASCULINITY  
 
Clausewitz draws on the popular3 analogy of a chameleon – a lizard with the ability to change 
its skin colour to blend with its surroundings, camouflaging itself depending on context, either 
for self-defence or as a means of catching prey – to illustrate the outer character or surface 
flexibility and fluidity of war. But for Clausewitz, war is ‘not only a veritable chameleon, 
because in each concrete case it changes somewhat its character, but it is also ... a strange 
trinity’ (Clausewitz, 1950: 18). Like chameleons unable to change their innate physiological 
nature, the inner nature of war, according to Clausewitz, does not change (although 
contemporary debates have challenged this notion, see for example Strachan and Herberg-
Rothe, 2007). It is the conception of the external change within the body and collective bodies 
that captures the essence of chameleon masculinity as a specialised form of operational and 
tactical military agency4 that is developed within the body of the military Stabilisation 
Operative.  
 
Chameleon masculinity military agency is a more calculated form of operational and tactical 
force that embodies Clausewitz’s ‘strange trinity’ (passion, chance, rationality) of dominant 
forces in specific ways. This is directed through carefully honed masculine performances and 
practices tailored to different audiences and environments in order to influence in-theatre 
military personnel and civilians to fulfil British political aims of ‘population-centred’ 
counterinsurgency and Stabilisation.  
 
The concept of chameleon masculinity builds on Laleh Khalili’s notion of the ‘soldier-
scholar’. Referring to the American context, but applicable also to the UK, Khalili 
demonstrates how Western liberal interventionism in Afghanistan created space within policy 
arenas for the generation of a new military masculinity. Driven by ‘white, literate, articulate 
and doctorate-festooned’ ‘soldier-scholars’, this new masculinity, on the surface, presents as 
                                                        
3 Scientific studies have revealed that chameleons, rather than changing colour to match their surroundings, 
instead have this ‘remarkable ability to exhibit complex and rapid colour changes during social interactions such 
as male contests or courtship’ (Teyssier, et. al. 2015). 
4 Agency defined in this case as the ability ‘to be the source and originator of acts’ (Rapport and Overing, 2001: 
1). 
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softer, sensitive, less violent, even humanitarian, when contrasted with the emblematic 
combat soldier, the ‘warrior kings’ of the traditional army (Khalili, 2010: 1475). This ‘new’ 
masculinity is represented as the ‘ultimate in civic virtue, ... the embodiment of international 
wisdom, war-fighting prowess, and a kind of knowingness about the world’ (Khalili, 2010: 
1487). Behind this is the belief that when translated operationally and tactically, the 
associated counterinsurgency practices and performances would win the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
civilian populations – ‘smart power’ (ibid.).  
 
However, in the American case this shift to a new military masculinity has ‘led to an 
institutional identity crisis that has coalesced around a discourse of institutional gender, or put 
another way, around the very ‘masculinity of the Army’ (Gardiner 2012: 371-372; Dyvik, 
forthcoming). The core masculine and patriarchal inner nature of the institution has been 
challenged by ‘population-centred’ counterinsurgency, and the varying iterations of national 
whole-of-government forms of ‘peace support’ that have ensued.  
 
This institutional identity crisis can also be read within the wider British military. Although, 
in the British context this can be conceptualised more as a rupture, an example of the ways in 
which the military has attempted to transition, sending painful ripples through traditional 
military male-dominated gender norms. Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszeley, a Scots Guards 
infantry soldier, notes some of the cultural challenges and tensions the army especially has 
faced as a result of this shift (Kiszeley, 2006). He highlights the conservative pride imbued, 
rigidly hierarchical and tradition bounded structures and associated cultures of the British 
army. The result is a fragile and defensive institution that fears destabilisation and is resistant 
to change. Culturally negative perceptions of counterinsurgency, ‘it’s not ‘proper’ soldiering’, 
along with misrecognition of counterinsurgency for traditional warfighting, provides a site for 
intense tension and operational and tactical challenges. This is “easy to do, because counter-
insurgency often looks, smells and feels like warfighting; indeed, some participants at some 
moments may be fighting for their lives”, however it’s through this resistance and 
misrecognition that “fundamental errors in application” can ensue (ibid.: 18) (my emphasis).  
 
While Kiszely does not explicitly refer to gender and the patriarchal nature of British military 
structures and culture, the gendered undercurrents throughout his writing are tangible. He 
reflects on the British military lesson-learning process claiming that ‘perhaps the single most 
significant cultural factor affecting a military’s ability to learn about counter-insurgency [and 
by extension the goals of Stabilisation] is the strength of its warrior ethos’ (ibid.). To have 
self-perceptions of ‘the warrior’ and a population-centred ‘something other’ is for Kiszely 
‘remarkably difficult’, since the two verge on being mutually exclusive. Herein lies the ‘space 
in-between’ and indeed the ‘bodies in-between’. The gendered challenge to the  ‘warrior 
ethos’ by the new masculinity of counterinsurgency and the resulting crisis of masculinity 
clearly shows the need for a gendered analysis to help articulate this ‘something other’ (see 
also, for example, Welland, 2015a).  
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The UK’s Military Stabilisation Support Group (MSSG) fills this space in-between and 
specifically trains this ‘something other’. The MSSG’s function (see figure 1) means that its 
members must learn to modify their military embodiment to engage with and facilitate 
particular social relations, and direct their agency towards a range of ‘audiences’ in the 
numerous spaces of the Afghan theatre of war (major air bases such as Camp Bastion or 
Kandahar, operating bases such as Lashkar Gah, out in the Forward Operating Bases and their 
environs - local villages, fields and wadis). Within all these spaces and regardless of the 
audience, the driving force is that the ‘people remain the prize’ (Kilcullen, 2006: 117).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Key Roles of Military Stabilisation Support Group Personnel [Developed from Field Notes] 
 
The MSSG is a small, specialist unit that at the time of my research had a complement of 
twenty-six regular personnel and one hundred reservists. In addition, cadres of around forty 
new recruits, drawn from across the services, were being trained for each six-month 
Operation Herrick5 tour of Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The Group played a key role in 
British operations in Helmand, being tasked in part with facilitating – operationally and 
tactically – wider British military adaptation to population-centred counterinsurgency and 
Stabilisation grand strategy. After three-months of intense training, these new military 
                                                        
5 Since 2002 ‘Operation Herrick’ has been the British codename for ISAF (International Security Assistance 
Force) interventions in Afghanistan. Unlike American military tours, which last a year, the majority of British 
tours last for six months. As a consequence, the British suffer from the effects of “six-month-ism”. One military 
Stabilisation Operative informant told me he chuckled when people say that the British have been in Afghanistan 
for five years, arguing, “No we haven’t, we’ve been there for ten lots of six months”. 
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Stabilisation Operatives deployed in specialist six-person teams (comprising an Officer, 
usually of Captain rank, and five SNCOs) alongside wider British military headquarter and 
battle group formations (representing a predominantly infantry chain of command). The 
Group is army led but tri-service; recruiting is opened out to the Royal Navy and Royal Air 
Force (troubling the distinction of ‘the soldier’ as solely tied to the army). It accepts regulars 
and reservists, men and women, officers and predominantly senior but some junior non-
commissioned officers, from across the spectrum of ‘teeth’ (‘close in and kill’) and ‘tail’ 
(supporting) arms (while recognising the changing nature of the ‘front line’ in Afghanistan 
and the range of specialist military personnel at this ‘coal face’). Indeed, this diverse ‘hybrid’ 
composition is spun as a selling point by the Group, with the claim that members are ‘able to 
shift and blend methodology between military and civilian thinking / behaviours due to this 
hybrid make-up’ (MSSG, 2015). It is to this ‘shifting and blending’, specifically in relation to 
social and sensory processes, that I now turn.  
 
 
 
2. SWITCHING HEADS  
 
 
How might we begin to understand the social and sensory processes involved in developing 
chameleon masculinity? In order to examine how the body of the infantry soldier is produced, 
the British ex-infantry soldier turned sociologist, John Hockey draws on phenomenological 
studies, notably using the work of Merleau-Ponty, to examine consciousness and the objects 
of direct experience (Hockey, 2009: 477-478). A phenomenological approach enables an 
“analysis in which the interrelationship between social and sensory processes is examined” 
(ibid.: 478). Hockey’s work on the sensory embodiment of the infantry patrol is valuable; it 
helps to highlight the challenges and tensions vis-à-vis the performances required of the 
Stabilisation Operative.  
 
These operatives are required to embed with (attach to military units) and fit into the infantry 
dominated military chain of command, and with infantry patrols on the ground. Traditional 
soldiering is the first essential building block of the Stabilisation role, if members do not ‘cut 
the mustard’ and master these combat skills and associated levels of fitness, their credibility 
and status are adversely affected in relation to their team members but also the wider (infantry 
dominated) military they would be operating alongside in theatre. As MSSG training Major 
R_ explained to me:  
 
I’ve had the opportunity to carry my weapon in many different environments, including 
conventional theatres. It’s very difficult to replicate training because you cannot generate the 
fear that a hostile environment creates. You do not have the resources to simulate outwards 
patrols. It you’re teeth arm trained you’re trained, you know when to lower your weapon and 
when not to. If you’re not from that background it’s different. You shouldn’t underestimate 
the requirement, so I’d rather military Stabilisation Operatives who can soldier [that is ‘teeth 
arm soldiers, rather than members of the ‘backward arms’ who have only basic or no 
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soldiering skills when starting Group training] because of the environment you’re in. 
 
He continued, referring to two types of power, formal and informal, formal relying on the 
authority of the uniform and rank, informal relying on leadership, teamwork and personality: 
 
One of the greatest weakness has been some of the MSSG’s Junior Officers, they were scarred 
from their operational tour, they had different experiences because of their characters and their 
personalities; they didn’t have the character to back up their rank. As a Major I automatically 
command the respect and credibility. The two Captains were ‘non-teeth’ Captains, they didn’t 
have the rank or the experience. (Fieldwork Interview.)  
 
Stabilisation Operatives therefore have the tricky task of being able to perform as credible 
infantry soldiers, with the associated desired masculine qualities of the combat soldier. At the 
same time, they must also be able to influence the ‘chain of command’ within military 
headquarters and out on the ground, which requires ‘moral character’ and lateral thinking in 
order to stand up and challenge up this ‘chain of command’. 
 
However, not all members are deemed able to make the transitions required from traditional 
soldiering roles tied into kinetic operations to the more ‘civilian dimensions’. The training 
Major continued, ‘At the moment we [the MSSG] are taking people, Senior NCOs and senior 
Captains who are too far in to change their character, without the ability or flexibility to 
understand the ‘audience’. This type of work requires flexibility of (masculine) performance, 
the ability to alter embodied practice and with this gain credibility, to both understand and 
influence the ‘audience’ towards the political objectives behind the role. They must be able to 
operate both according to traditional masculine soldiering values, and to also take on the role 
of mediators, politicians and advocates, both in relation to the local populations, and within 
their own organisation. If the Stabilisation Operative is able to gain this spectrum of 
credibility, that person has the means (if he or she has enough skill) to not so subtly 
“influence, cajole, and sometimes slap” infantry soldiers and upper military echelons they 
work alongside to adjust to populations centred counterinsurgency and broader Stabilisation 
practices.  
 
To achieve this flexibility, he told me that there is ‘a method of altering how you conduct 
yourself’. Connecting to Hockey’s analysis of British infantry soldiers on patrol, where the 
embodied nature of traditional combat soldiering is under examination, the phrase “switch 
on”, an infantry specific term, was used to indicate the switching “on” of the senses - through 
movement, sight, sound, smell and touch - the aim being to maximise ‘individual and 
collective capacity to kill the enemy’, as well as for personal and collective self-defence 
(2009: 481).  
 
The word “Switch” was also used frequently by my informants; for many, the hardest task 
was learning to “switch on and between heads”, a ‘soldier head’ and a ‘Stabilisation head’. As 
one Colour Sergeant explained, the soldier head “means you have to have full time situational 
awareness at any time. Being an asset to the real fighting troops who you are attached to, not a 
 11 
liability”, but at the same time, you also need to develop and know when to ‘switch on and to’ 
a Stabilisation head:  
 
Colour Sergeant (CS): Your Stabilisation head is always on, too, though, looking when out 
on the ground for opportunities to ensure the Helmand Implementation Plan is snapped up [by 
local nationals].  
L: A Stabilisation head, and a soldier head?  
CS: Yes, always two heads, but two heads that need to be quickly changed to whichever 
situation exists on the ground.  
L: The Stabilisation head is softer?  
CS: Not pink and fluffy as such, as the work is pretty full on. But in essence it is more a 
civilian mentality or indeed the way humanitarians work, but no we do not do humanitarian 
work [laughs], although sometimes we do interact, but only if they are truly viable options for 
the good and benefit of both the people and the GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan]. This is where Operators can get it very wrong. 
 
Chameleon masculinity therefore necessitates numerous embodied negotiations, in relation to 
the wider military (the ability to challenge up and down the chain of command) and in 
relation to civilian populations (direct kinetic violence verses ‘armed social work’, (Kilcullen, 
2006)). The MSSG training process, firstly, teaches new recruits to believe in the tenets of the 
broader Stabilisation approach (taught by soldier-scholars from the upper military echelons, 
but also ‘blooded’ Stabilisation Operatives who have preformed successfully in theatre); 
secondly, to then advocate these practices to the wider British military; and thirdly, to put 
these practices into motion out ‘on the ground’.  
 
However, this is not only premised on the ability to “switch on” as Hockey explains (2009: 
481), but also in this case on the ability to “switch heads”. While it is clearly a physical 
impossibility to simply switch heads, the corporeal metaphor must be performed and 
expressed in other ways, such as through posture, how weapons are carried and deployed, 
verbal reasoning and negotiating conceptualisations of ‘the enemy’. The embodied work of 
this kind of soldiering is therefore built on, expanded, challenged, and restrained by learning 
to embody this chameleon-like masculinity. 
 
In order to do so effectively, Stabilisation Operatives need to embody the ‘specific forms of 
cognitive and corporeal knowing’ of soldiering through movement, sight, sound, smell and 
touch. At the same time they also need this flexibility to “switch” between the cognitive and 
corporeal situated knowledge of the ‘teeth armed trained soldier’ and ‘Stabilisation head’. 
‘This lived space then produces specific forms of cognitive and corporeal knowing which are 
the outcome of spatial practices. These practices are socially specific in terms of being linked 
to particular physical features but also have their own history’ (Hockey, 2009: 481), as I shall 
show by a specific example of chameleon masculinity in action.  
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Helmand Province, Afghanistan: Operation Moshtarak    
 
Sam (a pseudonym), a Warrant Officer (SNCO) with a ‘teeth arm’ background and one of my 
key informants, described to me the ‘space of representation’ or ‘lived space’ (Lefebvre, 
1991) through the ways in which he directed agency through learnt Stabilisation practices. I 
first met Sam on the two-week introductory Stabilisation Practitioners course at the beginning 
of his three-month run up to operational deployment and shadowed him through parts of his 
UK training, meeting him once again on his return from Afghanistan. He told me about his 
experience of the large military push or ‘surge’ operation of his six-month tour, Operation 
Moshtarak. His account is an example of the ways in which he altered his own body response 
and the responses of the bodies around him, challenging the established patterns of situational 
and sensory awareness of the combat soldier. He relayed his experience to me with 
enthusiasm, as an example of a successful ‘Stabilisation’ mission:  
 
So we had one X_ [helicopter] go into Moshtarak on D-day at 0400 hours and I was on the 
fucker. There were fifteen SFSG [Special Forces Support Group], there were eight ATF 
[Afghanistan Task Force], there were eight 1 G_ [a section from a British platoon] and there 
was me and the medic Staff Sergeant and an Engineer Staff Sergeant who was there to build 
the PBs [Patrol Bases] once it’d all settled down. They were inserting him then because they 
didn’t expect to be able to get back there, it was going to be cut off. The time line from D-day 
to D+10 was meant to be our ten days of fighting into the kalay [village] to get to the centre 
where the mosque was, hold the mosque, hold a Shura [Arabic for consultation, a meeting 
where decisions are made] and explain [to the local nationals] what we were up to and then 
see what happened from there.  
We hit the deck, door down; HMVS [helmet mounted vision system] is on, and I ran off 
thinking I’m going straight into a bit of a battle here. But no battle! And we ended up walking 
towards the compound that we were going to, which was 200 metres short of the village, 
walking in there, taking it over, not a round fired. The sun came up, a small group of people 
started to congregate at the end of the village, and I thought well, there’s two ways it can go. 
 
While Sam’s embodied combat senses are “switched on”, it is at this point that he “switches 
heads”. He reads the environment by sight, drawing on the ‘cultural codes’ and the ‘particular 
cultural knowledge’ taught during Stabilisation training. He told me:  
 
But I thought, well there are kids there, there are women there, they’re not there to fight, it 
was glaringly obvious. They could have been and it would probably would have drifted that 
way if we’d have let it go, but it didn’t drift that way because I didn’t give it time.  
 
Sam then persuaded the team to take a less aggressive stance, in doing so challenging their 
trained situational and sensory awareness. Firstly, he was able to establish credibility, drawing 
on his ‘teeth arm’ background and informal and formal credibility:  
 
By this time the young Lieutenant and Captain [from the 1 G_] had realised that I was their Q 
[C’Q’MS, Company Quartermaster] at Sandhurst [military academy] and one had started to 
go “Oh Q, what do I do, what do I do?” So I said “Well, we need to go and have a look at ‘em 
and have a chat with ‘em”, and he said “Well what happens if they fucking decide to kick 
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off?” and I said “We’ll fucking slot the lot of ‘em”. I said “If they’re going to kick off it’s 
going to be at us so you just return fire”. 
 
While there was the potential for a direct ‘hard’ kinetic response Sam priorities the response 
of communication, he was then able to persuade the patrol to ‘go and have a chat’, with the 
aim of diffusing the situation. He persuaded the military bodies alongside him to alter their 
posture as they moved towards the village, by walking down the street with most weapons 
lowered, despite the intelligence report and conditioned training of these soldiers:  
 
We walked all the way down the 200 yards to the centre of the village by which time the 1G_ 
Captain and the SFSG were like “fucking hell” cloud nine, like that, but at the same time: “Oh 
my God, we’re going to get hit in a minute, we’re going to get hit in a minute”. The 1G_ were 
shitting themselves, the ATF were bayonets drawn ready to go. We got into the centre of the 
village; I walked into the shop, bought some tins of coke, crate of coke, helmet off, rifle on me 
back. 
 
For Sam the ‘courageous’ ‘warrior-like’ response was less aggressive posturing, and here he 
directly challenges and makes fun at the vulnerability of the traditional combat soldier’s 
embodied performances. From this position he then arranged a shura, sitting outside the 
Mosque with all 300 members of the village, “we all had a coke, by which time everybody 
started to calm down a bit, I held a Shura, had a chat, and explained why we were there”. As 
he reflected:  
 
So, yeah it was very good, but that was very strange because if I hadn’t gone and spoken to 
them [the villagers] straightaway then what would have happened? They would have turned 
hostile probably and then we’d have had a fight on our hands but we managed to kick it into 
touch quickly by going and having a chat with them. We sat there and I thought that’s mad 
and I remember sitting there going, right it’s D day I ain’t got the fuck what we’re going to do 
until D+10 because I’ve already held the Shura that I’m meant to have held on D+10, we’ve 
had no fighting. For the next fifteen days we had shura after shura we had meals we had 
BBQs, the lot, with the locals you know just to show willing. They absolutely loved it; they 
couldn’t have done anything more for us if they’d tried. 
 
Sam relayed this account to me as a positive example, often though Stabilisation Operatives 
were not as successful. As another one of my informants summarised:  
 
The majority of the guys on the ground, interacting with the locals are infantry. They are not 
known for their thinking approach. They are trained and internally educated in a narrow field 
of military operations and are bloody good at running around slotting people with their 
Bergens [military rucksacks] on their back. But generally, the ideas for COIN 
[counterinsurgency] or Stabilisation are not that easy to reconcile with red meat-eating killers. 
A lot of them do really, really, want to get into fire fights and slot some Taliban, have some 
dits [stories] to spin, get a medal. It’s what they trained for. It may not always be what they 
wanted to originally join for, but, unlike some salt water phobic matelots [Royal Navy sailors 
doing land rather than sea jobs], they want to do what they’ve been trained to do and get 
stuck in, not organise tea parties for old men [referring to shuras with village elders]. 
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Herein lies the tension of counterinsurgency and Stabilisation practice. It involves non-kinetic 
forms of violence, through ‘thinking’ and an associated re-embodied response, holding back 
on the direct kinetic violence of ‘slotting’ people, through ‘courageous restraint’ or ‘tactical 
patience’6, and functions around interacting in various social spaces, such as “organis[ing] tea 
parties for old men”. For the combat soldier (both on the ground and higher up the chain of 
command in military headquarters) this is a direct challenge to their embodied soldiering 
knowledge and the masculine practices they have learnt to valorise. For the trained 
Stabilisation Operative, the challenge is firstly to embody the practices required of this role as 
its re-appropriation of negatively gendered practices and performances, and then to perform 
effectively in theatre (non-kinetic violence). But how are these embodied performances 
trained in the UK?  
 
 
3. ORGANISING TEA PARTIES FOR OLD MEN    
 
To develop agency, Stabilisation Operatives embark on a gendered process of training to 
develop specific body reflexive practices. The spatial location of training is essential to the 
creation of gendered military identities, ‘Men [and women] are made’ outside on bleak 
windswept hills and plains, in freezing rivers, military barracks, class rooms, sports halls, 
messes, and bars (Woodward, 2003). Indeed, traditional combat training in such locations 
forms the base line of the three-month MSSG training package (developed through the eight 
sections of the army’s Military Annual Training Tests7 (MATTS)). However, context has 
opened up a new range of spaces, for example, the Afghan shura, and Forward Operating 
Bases (FOBs). Recruits would take a range of Stabilisation focused courses, involving 
classroom lectures, associated ‘desk-top’ exercises, and simulation role-plays, for example 
rehearsing how to build rapport and gather intelligence during shuras, as well as in operating 
from mock-up FOBs.  
 
In what follows, I examine how new recruits are taught to embody the flexibility of 
performance within two of these different spaces, and some of the tensions this reveals. 
Firstly, through a classroom lecture on ‘influencing and negotiating’ where Operatives are 
introduced to the space of the Afghan shura, a key site to ‘blend in’, gather intelligence and 
direct agency. Secondly, team role-play exercises in a mock up Forward Operating Base. 
Here, two elements that inform the ability to influence and negotiate are tested, through the 
                                                        
6 To address the balance between kinetic and non-kinetic action, one term that came into use was ‘courageous 
restraint’. Coined by American General Stanley McChrystal, courage, one of the valorised attributes of 
soldiering associated with bravery under fire, was connected to a form of self-control that associated bravery 
with the resistance of conditioned reflexes, valorising “the use of brainpower rather than firepower”. It was 
subsequently replaced by the phrase ‘tactical patience’, which was deemed to be less confusing for soldiers and, 
as one of my informants described, “more war-y”. 
7 MATTs: 1. Personal Weapon Training; 2. Fitness, 3. Battlefield Casualty Drills; 4. Chemical, Biological 
Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN), 5. Navigation; 6. Values and Standards; 7. Operational Law; 8. Survival, 
Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE).  
 15 
development of empathy, and the militarised and politicised opening out of conceptualisations 
of ‘the Other’ (Said, 1979: 1).  
 
 
Influencing and Negotiating  
 
During training recruits were told: “negotiating effectively will be at the heart of what you’ll 
be doing”. In their first “Negotiating and Influencing Skills” lecture, Dr Shields (a 
pseudonym) began by talking the teams through three senses: of ‘achievement’, ‘belonging’, 
and ‘control’, and the behaviours displayed by each. I am sat at the back of the classroom, 
listening with interest. Looking around, I note the majority of the class looks bored and 
unengaged. A few people are taking notes; the Reservists and Officers in the group appear to 
be concentrating the most. After this initial introduction, Dr Shield’s continued:  
 
I want to offer you some strategies and techniques, all of which will be cross-cultural. Shuras 
are core influence activities; they are deeply entrenched within Afghan culture. It’s all about 
the people, dealing with people; it’s complicated and messy. Here is a list of people where 
influence will lie [she runs through a powerpoint slide].  
 
The complexity and ‘messiness’ of learning to interact, of developing this highly politicised and 
militarised ‘cross-cultural’ knowledge, strikes a discord with the ‘simplicity’ of the list of influential 
players or key leaders to engage with. She continued:  
 
You’ll all be working at a tactical level; there will be repercussions from the decisions that 
you make and it’s the Shura that will be the backbone of these decisions. During this process 
trust is something you’ll need to earn, remember that you can lose it in a second. I strongly 
recommend you rehearse Shuras. Use them to establish and build trust.  
 
The building of ‘trust’ would depend on the correct performance, of being able to shift, blend and 
adapt, through ‘small talk’:   
 
One of the most important ways of working on the ground is through small talk. You must be 
aware of power play strategies. It’s vital that you know what people have said, agreed with 
and disagreed with. Build up rapport, start to dig in and interact with the locals. Becoming a 
better negotiator requires self-awareness.  
 
The teams would have to develop self-awareness, of how the body of the Stabilisation 
Operative, through postures, language and cultural knowledge could be used to direct agency, 
through the subtle forms of ‘power play’, a key embodied response that recruits would need 
to “switch” to.  
 
The class continues to look bored as she proceeds with the lecture. For some reason she is not 
winning credibility. When she talks about self-control and the emotions involved, one of the 
infantry trained soldiers who has been tapping his feet, checking his phone, laughing, looking 
around the room, says: “fucking hell, fuck this” just as Dr Shields says: “I promise you, 
emotion labelling is not ‘hippy dippy’, it is actually very powerful, the reason why it works is 
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that all of us like to know that someone is understanding and listening”.  
 
When she begins to talk about body language and mirroring the class becomes even more 
restless. Another male ‘teeth arm’ trained SNCO soldier gets up and walks out, something 
that I had not seen before. It was unclear to me why he walked out: was it because Dr Shields 
was female, or was it that she was female and talking about emotions etc.? There was real 
tension and in places overt resistance within the Group to this form of militarised masculinity, 
to becoming chameleon-like. Of course, not everyone in the room had this response, some 
participants were very engaged, although my discussion with Reservists afterwards revealed 
they had found the lecture quite patronising. Later I spoke with Major K_ who was running 
the training exercise, relaying the responses I had observed. I asked why he thought some had 
responded in a negative way, he replied: “these exercises put them outside of their comfort 
zone. The military has a tendency to be ‘shouty shouty’. In the negotiation exercises they’re 
actually having to learn to talk to people. When they come back from theatre they’ll actually 
be wishing that they had more negotiation training”.  
 
Crucially, in order to influence and negotiate, recruits would have to develop a carefully 
controlled understanding of ‘empathy’ and engage with conceptualisations of ‘the Other’:  
 
Empathy and the ‘Other’  
 
“What is the difference between sympathy and empathy?” was the question directed at the 
room in one of my first introductory lectures with the Group.  It was outlined that both were 
emotional responses and that sympathy was feeling ‘for’ someone without having an 
understanding for how they were feeling, while empathy was feeling ‘with’ someone, with the 
ability to consider a situation from the position of the other person. The conclusion was that 
“The good Stabilisation Operative has to learn to empathise.”  
 
Lectures and training exercises were designed to induce empathy and stimulate lateral 
thinking, but also to shape this emotional response and the method of thinking through a 
trained and controlled opening out of cultural awareness of ‘the Other’. Operatives were 
warned, in a lecture delivered by a soldier-scholar, that Stabilisation was “Not a moral 
crusade! But an important part of consolidating the battlefield” that they must not “Lose 
impartiality” towards the ‘Other’, remembering their partiality to the military mission. The 
aim was to “Spot threats or problems from the civilian dimension” but to do this they had to 
“Be fully aware of local conditions” through engagement with ‘the natives’ but must not “Go 
native – no tree hugging”. Within the ‘civilian dimension’ they must “Be approachable” but 
must not “Fall into the feel good trap”. As one of my informants explained, this was doing 
‘stuff that was nice for people’: “we’re not out there to do good things for people, we’re out 
there to make the mission work, but most people are cynical and bitter and twisted enough not 
to fall into the nice things to do trap”. Relatedly, there was a “fundamental fault line between 
the military and humanitarians, humanitarians are motivated by a moral compass”, 
something the military should not be in the same way.  
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Exercises, usually drawing on the experiences of the training staff, presented fictional 
(Afghan based) locations and scenarios, and required the teams to work together to collect 
cultural information, and then formulate a plan of action to a series of problems. Within this 
setting empathy, coded as a feminine quality, was appropriated, masculinised, and 
rationalised and a space created that allowed the expression of masculine performance based 
on these controlled practices.  Here, empathy became masculinised only because it was 
considered necessary to perform effectively ‘in theatre’, and ‘win the war’ – not a means to 
‘do nice stuff for people’, but as a means to ‘make the mission work’ (see also Welland, 
2015b: 117). However, compared to combat training, the boundaries of behaviour and 
associated thought process were much less tangible, they were fluid and grey; the teams were 
required to develop a subtle awareness of where these boundaries and constraints lay through 
training scenario after training scenario.  
 
Mock up Forward Operating Base (FOB) training put lectures and classroom exercises into 
practice. While some team members manned the sangers with their SA80 rifles and kept 
watch over the FOB, I watched as other team members interacted with various Afghans8 
walking up to the FOB to speak with the Operatives. Such ‘Walk-In’ role play exercises 
ranged from meeting local nationals at the FOB gate to escorting them in, and sitting down 
and listening to the issues they had. For example, three Afghan village elders arrive, furious 
because ISAF troops had been firing at their homes; another concerned a local national hurt 
during an ISAF offensive, where livestock had been killed; and a third concerns a drug raid 
by the ANP (Afghan National Police) resulting in the arrest of five men; the father of one, a 
village elder, wanted to know what has happened to his son, and a ‘local national’ reported 
that they had seen a member of ‘the Taliban’ loading a trailer. Afterwards, one of the training 
staff mentioned to me that despite the training it would take the Teams two months to get up 
to speed when they ‘hit the ground’, and even then they would need to realise that “there was 
no definitive solution”. I watched one Officer Commanding having a chat with his team, 
trying to explain to those who were struggling with the ambiguity of the role, stating that they 
needed to start “thinking outside the box”. Many of the new recruits ‘got it’, and, although a 
challenge, took to the role relatively quickly. Others found the ambiguity and flexibility 
frustrating. Informal conversation revealed that they just wanted to “go out and slot Taliban”. 
 
 
4. HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT? 
 
The practices of the Stabilisation Operative include the ability to influence the employment of 
both kinetic and importantly open up the potential for non-kinetic ‘effect’ through non-kinetic 
forms of violence. These are, however, hidden under a cloak of empathy and ‘tea parties’ - the 
ultimate aim still being to ‘destroy the enemy’. The violence of ‘collateral damage’ remains; 
it is merely amplified in a range of indirect ways.  
 
Over the last ten years the UK’s Military Stabilisation Support Group has had to fight to win 
                                                        
8 ‘British Born Afghans’, a collective term used for Afghans brought in to assist with training.  
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credibility with the wider British military. It has had to re-invent itself, to adapt to the 
centrality of the Group’s function during NATO-led operations in Afghanistan, and to 
counteract the perceived negatively gendered “pink and fluffy” stereotype attached to 
population-centred soldering roles. Worthy of note is the paradox produced between the speed 
at which military operations take place on the ground and the speed at which the Armed 
Forces as an entity change and adapt. It was evident during my research that the British 
military was just beginning to understand 1990s conceptions of Civil-Military Co-operation, 
that is, learning to de-conflict what the civilian population was doing from the main military 
effort, but it was patently evident that it was struggling to come to terms with Stabilisation 
aims and practices (as also demonstrated by Catignani, 2012). One informant reflected to me, 
the “military is catching up but it’s still a generation behind”. But what are the broader effects 
of this chameleon-like military operation and this particular form of violence that is ‘hidden in 
plain sight’? 
 
These indirect forms of violence, which can take a myriad of forms and stretch out along a 
political, economic and social continuum, become concealed through the agency of the 
chameleon-like masculinity of the Stabilisation Operative; this agency shifts, mutates, and 
does certainly become hidden in plain sight. Claire Duncanson, writing about the comparable 
‘softer’ ‘peacekeeper masculinity’ from 1990s Peace Support Operations, suggests that this 
gentler masculinity is ‘problematic because although it disrupts elements of the traditional 
linkages between militarism and masculinity, it still relies on a feminized and racialized 
‘Other’’ (Duncanson, 2009: 63). However, she argues that the peacekeeper masculinity ‘can 
alternatively be considered part of a ‘regendered military’ that may be a necessary component 
of successful conflict resolution’ (ibid).  
 
These problems remain with the ‘new’ masculinities opened up and deployed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. On the one hand, they can be read as opening the space for a (re)negotiation of 
gender that is potentially more progressive than some critiques would allow, providing an 
example of how the military can re-socialise its troops when it has the will or there is the 
political impetus, especially in relation to the inclusion of women, as well as shining a light 
on the rigidity of the predominantly male combat arms to change. But on the other hand, 
Stabilisation operatives are still agents of both kinetic and non-kinetic violence in the name of 
the State. Indeed, feminist critiques argue that these so-called ‘soft-power’ orientated soldier-
scholar masculinities are merely an example of how hegemonic ‘warrior’ masculinity has 
always functioned, shifting and mutating in order to retain power (Khalili, 2010; Dyvik, 
forthcoming). Khalili argues that such masculinities are not an example of progress, but a 
shift purely for what is needed at the time; doing nothing to tackle unequal gender relations, 
the privileging of masculinity over femininity and other subordinate masculinities, where 
relations of hierarchy are being continuously constructed through ‘othering’ and 
‘subordinating’ (Khalili, 2010; Wibben and McBride, 2012). Put another way, military 
personnel are only interested in local populations and their cultures in order to gather better 
intelligence. To do this they need to appear kinder, softer, and gentler when in fact the 
military is being deeply insidious in their use of local people to ‘defeat the enemy’.  
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Significantly, these Operatives encapsulate what has been politically represented by Western 
advocates for Stabilisation approaches as the ‘ultimate in civic virtue, ... the embodiment of 
international wisdom, war-fighting prowess, and a kind of knowingness about the world’ 
(Khalili, 2010: 1487). This connects to the broader politics and ethics Stabilisation Operatives 
serve and generally come to valorise. For example, Major R_, in the quote that introduces this 
article, states that the role of the Stabilisation Operative was like learning to become ‘ a bit 
like being a chameleon’, but not ‘ in a deceptive way’. My sense of this was that Major R_ 
was not being disingenuous and that he believed for the most part in what he was doing. This 
is similar to the explanation that the ‘switching heads’ Colour Sergeant gave me when he 
explained that his role was for the “good and benefit of the people”. However, the notion of 
the ‘compassionate soldier’ is problematic, as Welland (2015b) explicitly examines. The 
highly charged emotion of compassion as a belief in ‘doing good’ serves to obscure ‘the 
simultaneous presence of weaponry, violence and death’ (ibid.: 117). The politics this serves 
has been well documented. The general conceptualisation is that behind Western liberal 
interventionism, international peace and stability is threatened by ‘fragile states’, which are 
characterised by weak governance and violent conflict (Duffield, 2001). In fostering this 
Western interventionist liberal approach that bolsters and supports the development of these 
so-called ‘failing’ or ‘failed state’ structures and filling the perceived development gap by 
funding and designing projects at local and provincial levels, ‘stabilisation’ will ensue, 
conflict will decrease, and in so doing diminish international security threats from these 
sources (Duffield, 2002). Post 9/11 such approaches have proliferated. The development of 
the British ‘population-centred’ soldier is one of the ways in which the British military has 
responded to this overarching policy, illustrating how military personnel are subject to the 
politics of militarism in wider society.  
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
In this article I have shown how chameleon masculinity is an indirect form of concealed 
violence that is embodied and valorised by British Stabilisation Operatives. It reflects both the 
shifting tendency of the military originally raised by Clausewitz and also by my 
anthropological research. The embodiment of the Military Stabilisation Support Group is 
manifested through bodies, both individual and collective. The competing pulls, tensions and 
existential crises are expressed through the shift in outward character and inward nature to 
create this politicalised, militarised, and particularly gendered response. Herein lies the under-
researched space in-between where the traditional warrior ethos and its associated practices 
are challenged by the new chameleon-like masculinity of the Stabilisation Operative. The 
analogy of the chameleon proves useful to demonstrate not only the changing nature of 
military character, but also how gender can be manipulated in political and also emotional 
terms in the process of war.  
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